Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2010

A Conversation about Problem-Solving Courts: Take 2
Jane M. Spinak
Columbia Law School, spinak@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Jane M. Spinak, A Conversation about Problem-Solving Courts: Take 2, MARYLAND LAW JOURNAL OF RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS, VOL. 10, P. 113, 2010; NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL CLINICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 10/11 #5; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 10-245 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2499

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

New York Law School
Clinical Research Institute
Research Paper Series No. 10/11 # 5

A Conversation About Problem-Solving
Courts:
Take 2

Jane M. Spinak, Columbia Law School

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research
Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1631897

Do Not Delete

6/14/2010 3:46 PM

A CONVERSATION ABOUT PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS:
TAKE 2
JANE M. SPINAK*
The University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion,
Gender and Class symposium on problem-solving courts surfaced a
wide array of issues on the meaning and practices of these courts. My
prepared remarks at the symposium addressed the first issue discussed
in this article: the potential disparate impact of problem-solving
courts on minority families who are disproportionately affected by
these court processes. The second part of the article draws on the
discussion during the symposium to reflect on the difficulty supporters
and critics of the problem-solving court movement have in talking and
listening to each other.
I. INTRODUCTION
The nationwide problem-solving court reform movement
arrived in New York during the nineties, encompassing both criminal
and family courts.1 New York State created its first Family Court
Treatment Part (FCTP) in 1997,2 which was designated as a “model
Copyright © 2010 by Jane M. Spinak.
* Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would
like to thank Michele Cortese, Esq., Deputy Director of the Center for Family Representation,
for answering my endless questions and always providing insights into the workings of Family
Court and to congratulate her on being awarded the 2010 New York City Kathryn A.
McDonald Award for Excellence in Service to Family Court.
1. The Center for Court Innovation has been the locus for developing problem-solving
courts in New York overall, but family problem-solving court projects had multiple sponsors.
Center
for
Court
Innovation,
About,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pageID=471
(last
visited on Feb. 22, 2010); See also Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential
of Model Family Courts, 2002 WISC. L. REV., 331, 362 (2002) [hereinafter Adding Value to
Families].
2. Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 350. In the original FCTP, “parents
accused of neglecting their children because of their substance abuse participate[d] in an
extensive court conferencing and monitoring system. Parents eligible for the FCTP [were]
assessed by the FCTP clinical staff, [were] required to waive their right to a litigated hearing,
and must admit that the neglect was caused by their addiction. The parent then entere[d] into a
negotiated treatment plan that [had] been created by the FCTP clinical staff, the parent and her
counsel, the lawyer for the children, and the child protective agency's attorney and
caseworker; the plan [had] also been approved by the presiding judge. The parent [was] then
referred immediately to treatment providers who [had] contracted with the court to have
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court” site under the auspices of the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges Model Courts Project (the Project) in 1998.3 The
FCTP and the model court paradigm share several common features:
(1) an activist judge who helps to fashion, and then closely monitor,
dispositions; (2) a team of lawyers, social workers, and court personnel
who try to identify and then work toward common goals with the
family; and (3) frequent and meaningful court appearances by relevant
parties.4
When I first heard about problem-solving courts, I was excited
about the potential for these courts to have a positive effect on the way
in which Family Court treated the litigants passing through its doors
and on the outcomes for families mired in the child welfare and foster
care systems. The judges, lawyers, and court personnel most interested
in improving the court were leading the efforts and I wanted to join
them.5 In reality, this was the only game in town, if court reform was
available treatment spaces. What ensue[d] [was] an intensive period of court supervision, with
frequent in-court drug testing and appearances by the parent and other FCTP “team” members,
including the lawyers and agency caseworkers. Sanctions for positive drug tests or other lapses
in compliance with the treatment plan [] range[d] from more frequent drug testing and court
attendance to ultimate dismissal from the FCTP, which returne[d] the case to the general case
pool. Rewards [would] include longer periods of visitation and less supervision of the parent
with her children.” Id. at 332–33.
3. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Activities by State, New
York,
http://www.ncjfcj.org/images/stories/dept/states/Aug09/new%20york%20state%20outreach.pd
f (last visited on Apr. 13, 2010). The project’s official name was the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) Permanency Planning for Children’s
Department’s Child Victims Act Model Courts Project, which was funded by the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention. Adding Value to
Families, supra note 1, at 361–62. “The model courts initiative is described by its funder,
OJJDP, as “a nationwide effort to improve how courts handle child abuse and neglect cases,
[that] is helping children spend less time in foster care and resulting in earlier resolution of
cases in dependency courts.” The model courts are part of the larger effort by the
NCJFCJ/PPCD “to educate judges and other practitioners on the need to expedite secure safe
permanent placements for all maltreated children, either by making it possible for them to
safely stay with or return to their own families or by finding them safe adoptive homes.” Id.
The model court description also includes other key elements seen as essential for success:
interdisciplinary training and technical assistance for all youth-serving professionals using the
NCJFCJ's Resource Guidelines as a blueprint for improving court practice; identifying "lead"
judges to mobilize all the relevant players within their jurisdictions; developing programs that
can be seen as easily replicable in other jurisdictions; piloting innovative alternative dispute
resolution methods; and sharing information locally and nationwide through enhanced data
systems.”Id. The current version of the Project’s work is found at National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/view/81/145/ (last visited on Feb. 22,
2010).
4. Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 332.
5. I have served as a member of the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission
on Justice for Children (PJCJC) since 1995. “[T]he New York State Court of Appeals
designated [PJCJC] to implement the New York State Court Improvement Project (CIP), a
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the game.6 The movement was sweeping the entire country, building
on what appeared to be remarkable initial success in the adult drug
court arena.7 In 1996, the number of children in foster care peaked at
52,369 in New York State, which created a compelling urgency to try
new ways for the Family Court to address the significant family
disruptions that led to foster care.8 The problem-solving court
movement seemed like the answer.
Even at that early stage of the reform movement, however, I
began to wonder whether these courts would preserve the substantive
due process right of “family integrity” that protects the rights of
parents to raise their children as they choose and allows children to
grow up with their own unique family.9 In my first article on this
subject, I posed two questions. Could model problem-solving courts
dismiss cases which did not satisfy the requirements of jurisdictional

federally funded project to assess and improve foster care, termination of parental rights and
adoption proceedings.” New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on the Justice for
Children, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/justiceforchildren/index.shtml (last visited on Feb.
22, 2010). Two of the CIP pilot projects in Erie and New York counties were designated
NCJFCJ Model Courts by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. NEW
YORK STATE PERMANENT JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN,
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
15
YEAR
REPORT
19
(2006),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/justiceforchildren/PDF/Final%20Booklet%20to%20Print.pdf.
6. NEW YORK STATE PERMANENT JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN,
supra note 6, at 7. See also, Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 350.
7. See Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation
to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2003).
8. CONNA CRAIG & DEREK HERBERT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, THE
STATE OF THE CHILDREN: AN EXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT-RUN FOSTER CARE 12 (1997),
http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st210.pdf. In September 1998, 560,000 children were in foster care
nationwide. National Foster Care Statistics, http://library.adoption.com/articles/foster-carenational-statistics.html (last visited on Feb. 22, 2010).
9. In its most recent reaffirmation of family integrity, the Supreme Court concluded:
“In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
66 (2000). In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that, while the Court has yet to determine a
child’s liberty interest in his or her family bonds (including those beyond a parent), “it seems
. . . extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests
in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too,
must their interests be balanced in the equation.” Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such an
interest was found recently by a federal district court in Kenny A. v. Perdue, where the court
stated:
[C]hildren have fundamental liberty interests at stake in deprivation and
TPR proceedings. These include a child’s interest in his or her own safety,
health, and well-being, as well as an interest in maintaining the integrity of
the family unit and in having a relationship with his or her biological
parents.
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
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authority—either because the state could not prove the allegations of
neglect or abuse or because the state had not satisfied its own
requirements to provide services and assistance prior to filing a case in
court?10 Alternatively, would model problem-solving courts, believing
they could assist the families anyway, ignore those constitutional and
statutory restrictions?11
In tracking the publicly-stated goals and activities of model
courts around the country, I found that the principles for model court
practice prioritized “avoiding unnecessary separation of children and
families” and supporting “reunification” of families while keeping
children safe.12 During the initial five years that followed the
establishment of the Project, however, the model courts focused on
goals of efficiency and administrative effectiveness rather than
substantive outcomes.13 I encouraged the courts to move beyond the
administrative process goals to use the specialized nature of the model
court structures—collaborative systemic planning, team conferencing
and other alternative dispute resolution processes, and significant
participation by the families themselves—as tools to achieve family
integrity rather than as ends of their own.14
While I still believe that a problem-solving court must be
committed to using these tools to pursue family integrity, child safety
and permanency, my belief in the ability of these courts to do so has
significantly diminished. I have addressed this concern elsewhere by
considering the historical roots of problem-solving courts in the
trajectory of the Family Court through the Twentieth Century15 and by
10. Adding Value to Families supra note 1, at 340–42.
11. Id. at 340–44, 371–74. An issue I had not considered at the time was whether courts
could intervene in family life to assist families without explicit jurisdictional authority. For an
example of such a “court,” see Riverside Superior Court - Family Preservation Court,
available at
http://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/famprescrt/index.html#Procedures
(last
visited on Apr. 25, 2010).
12. Id. at 367 (referring to NCJFCJ’s Resource Guidelines).
13. Id. at 364. See infra pp. 22–23 for discussion on the continued tension concerning
the purpose of problem-solving courts.
14. Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 370–71. While I made these
recommendations in the context of model courts, they apply generally to family court which is
considered the original problem solving court. Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM.
CT. REV. 258, 271 (2008) [hereinafter Romancing the Court]. See also Hon. Leonard P.
Edwards, Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Santa Clara, Remarks on Receiving the William H.
Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence at the U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C. (Nov.
18, 2004), available at http://www.improvingoutcomesnetwork.org/viewarticles.jsp (“Juvenile
Court is the original problem-solving court.”).
15. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 258. (“[L]essons gleaned from over 100
years of family court history suggest that court-based solutions to intractable social problems
have rarely been effective . . . [N]either the structural issues that courts face, such as

Do Not Delete

2010]

6/14/2010 3:46 PM

A CONVERSATION: TAKE 2

117

scrutinizing the limitations of current Family Court reform efforts.16
For purposes of this article, I want to focus on two somewhat unrelated
issues about problem-solving courts. My prepared remarks at the
symposium addressed the first issue to be discussed: the potential
disparate impact of problem-solving courts on minority families who
are disproportionately affected by these court processes.17 The second
part of the article draws on the discussion during the symposium to
reflect on the difficulty supporters and critics of the problem-solving
court movement have in talking and listening to each other
II. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND DISPARATE IMPACT
Two aspects of problem-solving courts may exacerbate the
disparate impact of their processes on families of color. The first is
that by situating the central process of problem-solving for courtinvolved families in the court rather than in the community, the
opportunity for pre-court assistance and services may be lost. The
incentives for crafting more local, and potentially more effective and
comprehensive solutions, are diminished if the court process is likely
to subsume those efforts through its own problem-solving paradigm.
At the same time, the court loses the insight that may come from
seeing how families address the issues that result in court intervention
overwhelming numbers of cases, nor the momentous societal issues that problem-solving
courts have recently begun to shoulder can be adequately addressed through court-based
solutions. The factors that allegedly distinguish new problem-solving courts from earlier
exemplars, especially the family court, are both less unique and less successful than they have
been portrayed by problem-solving court enthusiasts.”).
16. Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right between Rhetoric and
Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 19–27 (2010). Current family court reform efforts are
limited in their effectiveness for several reasons. Reformers have relied too heavily on stories
to identify success, have been unwilling to frame questions about reform differently, have
relied on conventional reasons for success or failure, and have not subjected reform efforts to
rigorous analysis [hereinafter Reforming Family Court]. Id. at 38.
17. Professor Eric J. Miller has explored this issue considerably. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller,
Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Intervention, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1479, 1568 (2004) [hereinafter Embracing Addiction]; See also Eric J. Miller, Drugs,
Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 427–31 (2009) [hereinafter
New Penology]; Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, 20 FED.
SENT’G REP. 127 (2007) [Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts]. See also Emily
Wall, Finding a Right to a Speedy Trial in Child Welfare Cases: Recognizing the Value of
Time 31–34 (Sept. 21, 2009) (summarizing earlier findings of disproportionality of minority
families in the child welfare system) (unpublished note, on file with author). The NCJFCJ has
recently launched the Courts Catalyzing Change initiative to respond to the disproportionate
numbers of children of color in the child welfare and foster care systems and the disparate
outcomes these children experience. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,
Courts Catalyzing Change, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/447/580 (last visited
on Feb. 22, 2010).
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within their communities, and the potential to use that insight if or
when families ultimately require court intervention.18 Additionally, the
creation of problem-solving courts may result in more families being
drawn into the court system—often referred to as “net widening”19—
because the lack of community resources leaves the court as the only
place to secure help.20 Moreover, the back-end services that a problemsolving court may provide come with additional burdens, including
increased surveillance of the family and the stigma attached to being
subject to court processes.21 Finally, court-based solutions focus on the
18. See CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 19
(2008) at 19–20 (discussing how focus groups in Texas identified aspects of disproportionality
in Texas that included a lack of understanding of the social conditions of communities and the
failure to engage with the community.) [hereinafter CHAPIN HALL REPORT].
19. The term has been frequently used in the criminal and juvenile court context to
indicate how court-based service or diversion programs may actually bring more people under
court surveillance and supervision. See, e.g., Mark Ezell, Juvenile Arbitration: Net Widening
and Other Unintended Consequences, 26 J.RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 358, 375–76 (1989)
(discussing how a juvenile court diversionary arbitration program resulted in more youth being
supervised by the court, placed on probation or committed by the judge.) See also, Judge
Morris B. Hoffman, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs with Professor Nolan, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1567, 1567 (2003) (describing the net-widening effect of the Denver Drug Court).
20. See Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering
Enthusiasm with Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 435, 435–36, 442, 444 (2002); Therapeutic
Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 127. “Establishing community-based
alternatives to detention (and removal from the home) and utilizing the least restrictive
supervision options are essential components of reducing racial and ethnic disproportionality
in both systems. Unfortunately, too often, to be eligible for services, a youth must already
have penetrated deeply into one or both systems. This is not good for children and families,
nor is it a cost-effective way to provide supports.” CHAPIN HALL REPORT, supra note 18, at 74.
See also, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO HELP STATES REDUCE THE PROPORTION IN
CARE 31 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07816.pdf (“Court officials in California
said that initiatives to refer drug offenders to treatment programs instead of incarceration have
increased competition for accessing publicly funded substance abuse programs, adding to the
difficulties families may face in making changes needed for reunification. In addition, when
services are available, it may take 2 years for a parent to complete a substance abuse treatment
program, and entry into such programs may be delayed if there are waiting lists for services.”)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
21. See Corey Shdaimah, Taking a Stand in a Not-So-Perfect World: What’s a Critical
Supporter of Problem-Solving Courts to Do?, 10 U. MD J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
89 (2010); see also Carren S. Oler, Unacknowledged Shame, Unresolved Family Cases, 38
MD. B. J.12, 14–16 (“Shame is a family of painful emotions which generally are hidden and
may include inadequacy, humiliation and embarrassment.”); Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E.
Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453–56 (2002) (on
increased court supervision); James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: ProblemSolving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1562 (2003) (“Therapeutic
jurisprudence also allows the court to extend its authority into the lives of drug court clients in
unprecedented ways,”) (using as an example judges who supported a measure to dispense with
probable cause in order to randomly search drug court participants’ homes).
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responsibility of the individual: did this parent neglect her child? Is
this youth a runaway or truant?22 The court is not deciding whether
society has provided comprehensive supports for families and children
that might eliminate or ameliorate the need for court intervention at
all.23
The second aspect of problem-solving courts that may
exacerbate the disparate impact of their processes on families of color
emanates from the first: court-based problem solving is predominantly
judge-based problem solving. This results in a system in which the
traditional due process protections afforded by an impartial judge are
exchanged for judicial leadership that creates its own conception of
fairness and due process.24 Such a system may be particularly
vulnerable to creating a disparate impact on families of color.25
A. Situating Problem-Solving in Courts
A persistent question nagging the problem-solving court
movement is whether the problem to be solved is best solved through
court processes.26 The National Association of Criminal Defense
22. New Penology, supra note 17, at 427, 432 (discussing how the individual
responsibility therapeutic model in drug courts doesn’t engage “with the wider perspective of
governmental and social failure that is the backdrop against which many drug addicts live their
lives”).
23. While family court judges have a statutory duty to determine whether “reasonable
efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families (i) prior to the placement of a child in
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child's home; and (ii) to make it
possible for a child to safely return to the child's home.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006) (as
amended by the Adoption And Safe Families Act of 1997), a recent report noted that judges
found that “reasonable efforts” to achieve permanency for children in foster care were made in
all but six out of 463 permanency cases reviewed in the study, raising “questions regarding the
threshold used to make these determinations and the relevance of such findings.” CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS, THE LONG ROAD HOME: STRANDED IN NEW YORK CITY FOSTER CARE 192 (2009),
available
at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2009/11/2009-1102_long_road_home_full_report_final.pdf. For a discussion of the state of child well being
generally in the United States, see UNICEF, AN OVERVIEW OF CHILD WELL-BEING IN RICH
COUNTRIES: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE LIVES AND WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS IN THE ECONOMICALLY ADVANCED NATIONS 2 (2007), http://www.unicefirc.org/publications/pdf/rc7_eng.pdf (ranking the United States twenty out of twenty-one
among the countries surveyed on six measures of child well being).
24. See discussion infra at notes 61–63 (discussing an example of the N.Y. treatment
parts that still haven’t adopted statewide basic protocols on how the courts should work);
Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 127 (pointing out the
difficulty of measuring success because of the range of models used in problem solving
courts).
25. See discussion infra at pp. 8–10.
26. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 259–60. This has been a central query
within the family court since its inception. Id.
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Lawyers (NACDL) recently released a report on drug courts
recommending that substance abuse treatment be considered a public
health rather than a criminal justice issue.27 The report warns that the
criminal justice paradigm for substance abuse treatment “legitimizes
drugs (sic) courts while ignoring other smart, fair, effective, and
economical approaches.”28 Similarly, in recent years, the practice of
diverting adolescent status offenses from family court jurisdiction and
dual tracking child protection investigations to community-based
assistance by distinguishing between cases likely to need court
intervention and those more suited for voluntary provision of services,
is based on an understanding that readily available, community crafted
assistance that avoids court entirely may be more effective in
addressing family needs.29
Nevertheless, the proliferation of problem-solving courts in
multiple dimensions of minority and poor peoples’ lives30—from drug
courts to truancy courts to homelessness courts to reentry courts—
reinforces a belief that these problems are best addressed by judges in
27. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, AMERICA’S PROBLEMSOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 10 (2009),
ASSOCIATION
OF
CRIMINAL
DEFENSE
LAWYERS]
[hereinafter
NATIONAL
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/665b5fa31f96bc4085
2574260057a81f/$FILE/problem-solvingreport_110409_629(K+PMS3145).pdf. See also
Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 590, 595–600 (2005) (arguing for an empirically-based system of assistance to
address the multiplicity of factors that produce child maltreatment and subsequent child
welfare interventions, including foster care).
28. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 10.
29. Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 35–36 (discussing diversion of status
offense cases based on programs developed and evaluated by the Vera Institute of Justice);
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO CHILD
MALTREATMENT: FINDINGS FROM NCANDS 21–22 (2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/05/childmaltreat-resp/report.pdf (“The findings are consistent with the expectation that these families’
circumstances may not warrant a traditional [Child Protective Services] response, but can
benefit from some intervention to prevent potential or future maltreatment . . . It appears that
services are being provided to a greater proportion of families who receive an alternative
response. It also appears from this data that even though children who had been previously
referred to alternative response do experience subsequent reports and responses by CPS, in
general they are not at any greater risk for subsequent reports than those who received an
investigation. Furthermore, they are not at any greater risk for subsequent victimization. With
this knowledge, at the system level, agencies that refer children and families to the alternative
response or investigation track may be confident that, if specified guidelines guide the
decision, the child’s future safety is no more likely to be compromised.”).
30. The “national phenomenon” of the overrepresentation of minority children and
families in child welfare and family court systems has been well documented. THE CENTER
FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, RACE EQUITY REVIEW: FINDINGS FROM A QUALITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES IN MICHIGAN’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1 (2009) [hereinafter THE CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY]. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
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what have been called “therapeutic” court settings rather than by other
means.31 Writing about criminal reentry courts, Professor Eric Miller
questions “whether this therapeutic paradigm unfairly places
accountability for reentry issues on individual offenders while
minimizing governmental responsibility for a range of institutional
failures in the areas of health care, education, housing and
employment.”32 Both the standard Family Court and the current
problem-solving variations on that standard similarly place
accountability on the individual rather than on the predominant causes
of neglect and abuse: poverty and its ensuing hardships.33 Moreover,
according to Professor Miller, “[t]herapy and responsibility
disaggregate the problem of drug crime from social and governmental
forces. They take the emphasis off the increasing racial segregation
and class stratification of the inner city, and emphasize the personal
characteristics of the addict.”34 Instead, these underlying causes and
the broader societal and institutional failures to address them are
marginalized when the judiciary shifts the burden of resolution onto
the individual through a judge-driven therapeutic mechanism.35
Centering the resolution of these issues on the individual parent
in a problem-solving proceeding assumes that the parent has access to
and is supported by a system of services and assistance that maximizes
the parent’s ability to resolve the child protection issues facing her
31. Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and
Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1517–25 (2003). See also
JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 57–59
(2001).
32. Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 127. Professor
Miller expresses considerable concern that “[g]iven that the central problem facing exprisoners reentering society is the failure of the government to adequately provide medical,
education, health, housing, and other social services before they were incarcerated and upon
release, it is essential to question the drug and reentry courts’ emphasis on personal
responsibility. The therapeutic model, in this setting, appears to have the effect of attempting
to convince the ex-inmate that these social failings are of little consequence: the problem is the
ex-inmate’s life choices, rather than society’s choices about where and how to distribute its
resources to different communities.” Id. at 131.
33. Garrison, supra note 27, at 612–14 (identifying poverty as the most important risk
factor in child maltreatment but also discussing the correlation among multiple risk factors).
34. New Penology, supra note 17, at 427. Miller also quotes Douglas Massey and Nancy
Denton, who state that “one third of all African Americans in the United States live under
conditions of intense racial segregation.” Id. at 428 (citing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77
(1996)).
35. Garrison, supra note 27, at 595–99 (outlining the various ways in which social
policies and law have failed to understand, prevent or address child maltreatment). The more
the burden for addressing child welfare is placed on the individual through the therapeuticjudicial paradigm, the less likely that Garrison’s recommendations will be considered.
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family. If, for example, African-American families do not have
consistent access to prevention and early intervention services, their
communities lack basic services, there is an unequal distribution of
state resources to African-American communities, and these families
struggle “to find and maintain suitable and affordable housing, reliable
transportation, and a legal source of regular income,” the disparate
impact on the ability of these families to resolve their child welfare
issues is readily apparent. This was a central conclusion of a recent
study of decision-making in child welfare cases in Michigan by the
Center for the Study of Social Policy.36 The study further concluded
that both child protective services and the court system failed to
recognize or draw on the strengths of African-American families, to
consider community-based, non-traditional resources for these
families, to engage the families in authentic participation in decisionmaking, or to respect family recommendations.37 The study further
found that the failure to engage the families and their communities in a
discussion about what resources and assistance could assist the
families were among the factors that led to disproportionate numbers
of children being removed from their families and communities.38
36. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 20 (“While both
Caucasian and African American families were living in poverty, this Review observed the
particularly pernicious effects of poverty on African American families.”); Embracing
Addiction, supra note 17, at 1568 (“Statistical evidence suggest that poorer offenders are more
likely to agree to go to drug court than rich ones . . . The differential impact of the criminal
justice system on poor individuals may be exacerbated for minorities, who are much more
likely to receive incarcerative sentences than non-minorities. Such factors may lead poor and
minority defendants to access diversion into drug court where others would not.”) New
Penology, supra note 17, at 425 (“ I shall suggest that the drug court’s success in generating
broad bipartisan appeal stems from its therapeutic approach to drug offenders, one in which
responsibility replaces race as the major issue facing individual addicts.”).
37. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 19; New Penology,
supra note 17, at 425 (discussing “what David Garland calls a ‘responsibilization strategy’
placing the onus on individuals to alter their conduct rather than on emphasizing rights to
access government social welfare services.”) (citing DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 118, 124 (2001)).
38. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 20–22, 37–38, 43–
44. See also Alan J Dettlaff & Joan R Rycraft, Deconstructing Disproportionality: Views
From Multiple Community Stakeholders, 87 CHILD WELFARE 37, 55 (2008) (“Finally, findings
from these focus groups clearly indicate the need for child welfare agencies to improve their
relationship with the community. To reduce disproportionality, child welfare agencies must
ally themselves with communities and draw upon the strengths of communities to address this
problem. To facilitate meaningful engagement, efforts must be long-term and consistent.
Meetings and open forums should be held with community groups, churches, schools, and
other community stakeholders on a consistent basis. Agency administrators should establish
connections with community agencies to develop collaborative partnerships that work toward
the common goal of improving outcomes for children and families. Additional strategies
include the establishment of satellite offices within communities and the development of
community-based family service centers that emphasize community support and prevention.”).
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Equally disturbing, the study found “little evidence of monitoring for
the quality and the cultural relevance of the services provided,” and
“no evidence of institutional policies and practices to hold these
practitioners accountable for the quality of their work.”39 Children
were considered better off removed from their families because child
protective services and the courts doubted that the children’s
communities could take care of them.40
Shifting resources and planning to the court system as the
problem-solver rather than providing resources and financial support
to empower communities to create effective strategies and solutions
will do little to eliminate the problem of disparate treatment.41 In fact,
shifting to back-end services increases surveillance of parents that can
result in additional monitoring,42 additional legal proceedings,43 and
even a shift into the criminal justice system with potentially dire
consequences, including denying access to many public benefits.44 The
constant monitoring of parents in many problem-solving court
paradigms, such as Family Treatment Drug Courts (FTDC), not only
enables the court to assure a parent’s compliance with court ordered
treatment and services, but also provides the opportunity to sanction
her failure to do so.45 Sanctions range from additional court
appearances to jail.46 The collateral consequences of penetrating the
39. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 37.
40. Id. at 17 (“[T]he Review documented both stated and operational assumption that
African American children would fare better if removed from their families and
communities.”).
41. Garrison’s analysis of the problems with the way in which maltreatment is addressed
highlights the need for empirical analyses of the way in which child maltreatment is addressed
in child welfare systems. Garrison, supra note 27, at 606–11. As difficult as it may be to use
rigorous empirical analysis in child welfare systems, analysis of court-based intervention is
even more daunting. Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 19–27 (describing the failure
to measure federally funded court reform efforts).
42. Shdaimah, supra note 21, at 98–99; See also Judge Nicolette M. Pach (ret.), An
Overview of Operational Family Dependency Treatment Courts, 6 DRUG CT. REV., 67, 99–
100.
43. Pach, supra note 42, at 99.
44. In some FTDCs, failure to comply with treatment or court mandates, sanctions can
include jail. Id. at 90–91. Some of these courts have concurrent criminal and civil jurisdiction,
heightening the possibility of significant collateral consequences. Philip Genty, Damage to
Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1671, 1673 (2003). Even if there is no criminal conviction, the impact on families of
parents being incarcerated is well documented. See e.g., id. at 1671–72.
45. Pach, supra note 42, at 90; see discussion infra pp. 14–15 on FDTC.
46. Pach, supra note 42, at 90–91. The California Supreme Court recently held that the
juvenile dependency court does not have the statutory authority to punish a parent for
contempt (and order contempt sanctions such as jail time) solely on the basis that the parent
has failed to comply with court-ordered drug treatment. In re Nolan W., 45 Cal.4th 1217
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criminal justice system for failure to comply with an FTDC order
could result in insurmountable barriers to reunification of the family.47
And the ultimate punishment for failure in FTDC is a parent
permanently losing custody of her child.48
The potential disparate impact on minority families of creating
and situating solutions to child welfare issues in problem-solving
courts arises out of three interconnected aspects of these courts. The
first is that placing accountability on the individual to solve the
problem fails to consider the lack of community and governmental
resources available within minority communities to address the issues
these families face. The second is that community-based solutions that
could draw on the strengths of the community are unlikely to be
developed if court-based solutions are the norm. This means that help
is less likely to be provided until the family reaches court and that the
assistance is less likely to be crafted with a deep understanding of
community needs or strengths. And lastly, once the family reaches
court, the traditional due process protections afforded by an impartial
judge no longer serve as a final defense to improper government
intervention, as the next section discusses.
B. Judicial Leadership
The role of the judge as a leader of a therapeutic team
reinforces the shift of services from the community to the court, as
well as the re-characterization of those services from social
responsibilities to individualized needs. The team leader role also

(2009). While the court declined to address the impact of its ruling on juvenile court drug
courts, Id. at 1226 n.3, the Administrative Office of the Courts of California recently issued a
“fact sheet” indicating that incarcerative sanctions were no longer available to use in juvenile
dependency drug courts as a result of the Nolan W. decision. Changing Behavior: Incentives
and
Sanctions
in
Juvenile
Dependency
Drug
Court,
March
2010,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/factsheets/jddc.pdf (last visited on Apr. 27,
2010).
47. Most FDTCs do not have criminal jurisdiction or sanctions; for those that do,
however, the collateral consequences can be devastating. See Reentry Resource Center New
York, http://www.reentry.net/ny/ (last visited on Feb. 22, 2010); See also Michael Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–40 (2006).
48. NPC RESEARCH, FAMILY TREATMENT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT
2 (2007); Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1239–40 (1998). As Professor Richard Boldt has warned
in the criminal court context, failure to be cured results in punishment. In the family court
context, that includes termination of parental rights.
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fundamentally changes the nature of the judge’s job.49 While the
therapeutic leader is heralded as innovative in the problem-solving
court movement, the roots and controversy of this role are deep in the
history of the original family court.50 In writing about the early
development of family courts, one writer opined in 1919:
The judgments of a judicial officer as at present
constituted in this country are confined to the pleadings
and to the testimony taken in open court. He does not
take the initiative in any proceeding brought before
him. His sole duty is to determine under the law and the
facts the questions presented. The judge of a family
court must have larger powers than these. He must be at
liberty to investigate or cause to be investigated every
anti-social or abnormal act growing out of family
disturbances. His duties must necessarily be
inquisitorial rather than accusatory. . .To empower a
judge to act on his own initiative immediately and
without pleadings; to authorize him to become the
general supervisor and mentor of the home and its
several occupants, will be a new thing in our
jurisprudence. It is apparent, therefore, that a judge who
is given these extraordinary powers must be a man well
versed in the law, of large experience, unswerving
firmness, broad sympathies, and clear, quick and
accurate judgments. Wanting in any of these elements,
his work must fail.51
The quote describes the judge as the hero who, lacking any of
these extraordinary powers or virtues, succumbs to defeat. One way in
which defeat has been averted (since having all of these “elements” is

49. NOLAN, supra note 31, at 90–110 (analyzing the differences between our conception
of a common law judge and the drug court judge. In particular, it highlights a significant
departure from the impartial, restrained, objective judge in the common law tradition. Nolan’s
description is equally applicable to other problem solving courts.). See also NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 27 (“When participants enter
drug court they would be well-advised to “[p]repare to turn our life over to this judge and her
whims for at least the next year or two.” One judge candidly admitted that he did things that
were “absolutely over the line in the canons of judicial conduct” such as midnight curfew
checks on participants and sitting in on treatment meetings.”).
50. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 259, 269–71.
51. Willis B. Perkins, Family Courts, 17 MICH. L. REV. 378, 380–81 (1918-1919).
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beyond the capacity of most humans, let alone judges),52 has been the
imposition of significant due process protections in family court
proceedings to guard not only the litigants, but also the judge, from his
own heroism.53 As a result, the prescribed role of the Family Court
judge during the last quarter of the Twentieth Century included serving
as a gatekeeper against government overreaching,54 a check against
bad decision-making on the part of government agents,55 a protector of
the due process rights of parents and children,56 and an insurer of
fairness and impartiality.57 If the judge’s primary role is to revert
instead “to investigate. . .every anti-social or abnormal act growing out
of family disturbances. . .[and]to authorize him to become the general
supervisor and mentor of the home,”58 what is the effect on his role of
impartial decision-maker and protector against government

52. A description of a family court judge in the mid-Twentieth Century captures the
concern about infallibility:
Because each judge must form his own awareness of his lacks, some of
those who come to this bench remain entirely untutored and, possibly as a
form of self-defense, scornful of what they do not understand. One, for
example, proudly says that he had never been in the court in any capacity
until the day of this appointment; then he sat on the bench with another
judge during a morning’s session; and that very afternoon he began
hearing and deciding cases without further aid or training. During his
years of service, he adds, he has never had a moment’s worry about the
soundness of a single one of the thousands of cases he has judged. One
can only add that his equanimity is not shared by all.
Walter Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City 102–03 (1954).
53. Barry C. Feld has called this the “constitutional domestication of the juvenile court,”
which began with Kent v. United States and fully blossomed with In re Gault and In re
Winship. BARRY C. FIELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL, 8–13
(Thompson/West ed., 2003). See also Geraghty & Mlyniec, supra note 20, at 438. (“As we all
know, the Pre-Gault juvenile court became a nightmare. The services that it offered often
resulted in very coercive sanctions against children and families. Justice was quite irrational
and subject to the personality of the particular judge who presided. Due process was secondary
to the subjective evaluation of what the judge believed was in the child's ‘best interests.’”).
54. See e.g., In re Nassau County Dept. of Social Serv. ex rel Dantia v. Denise J., 661
N.E. 2d 138, 139–40 (1995) (finding that a report which shows only child's positive
toxicology for controlled substance generally does not in and of itself prove that the child has
been neglected).
55. The court must find that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify
families (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for
removing the child's home; and (ii) to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child's
home.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-82, 111 Stat. 2115.
56. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–78 (1982) (“Before a state may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that
the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”).
57. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (finding that an unwed father was
entitled to hearing on his fitness as parent before his children could be taken from him).
58. Perkins, supra note 51.
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overreaching? In the context we are discussing now, those roles may
be the last hope for diminishing the disparate impact of the child
welfare system on children and families of color.59
The following example will enable me to illustrate my
concern.60 One of the FTDC in New York City that has been in
existence for over ten years employed the following practices until
very recently.61 The FTDC staff would identify potential FTDC parent
participants from the cases being filed. After a petition was filed, the
FTDC coordinator would discuss with the parent the possibility of
entering the FTDC prior to the parent speaking to her attorney (the
right to counsel for indigent respondents in New York attaches when a
petition is filed).62 The FTDC coordinator would explain how the
FTDC works but would not discuss the parent’s legal rights. If the
parent thought she might want to participate, she would agree to an
assessment and sign an assessment waiver which indicated that
information in the assessment would not be used against her in the
future. She would then have the opportunity to speak to her lawyer and
learn that the conditions of participation included making an admission
of neglect and waiving the statutory right to a preliminary hearing on
the removal of any child from the parent’s custody. The FTDC staff
approved only certain treatment and service programs and their
assessment of the programs was accepted at face value by the judge.
Family visiting procedures with children were often inflexible.
59. The current due process paradigm has not been implemented in ways that would
ensure fairness and impartiality for children and families. But I have suggested elsewhere that
there are ways to measure whether such a paradigm would be better for children and families
than the problem-solving approach. Reforming the Court, supra note 17, at 34–38.
60. While I’m using the example of FTDC, other examples of judges creating their own
rules could also raise these issues. See, e.g., Joy S. Rosenthal, An Argument for Joint Custody
as an Option for All Family Court Mediation Program Participants, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV.
127, 151 (2007) (positing that the family court judges’ stated policy in Brooklyn to deny joint
custody in mediated agreements was not “overtly contemplating that people of a certain class
or race could not handle the responsibility of such a determination. However, since we have a
kind of de facto segregation among the Courts, the impact of what happens in Family Court is
certainly felt more in poor, non-white communities than it is in the general population.”).
61. Even though several of these practices have changed recently, the requirement of
admitting neglect and the inability to conduct a post removal hearing remain in effect.
Moreover, this FTDC has ten years of enforcing these particular practices so they were applied
to a significant number of respondents over that time period. This example is based on
conversations the author has had with attorneys who have practiced in this FTDC. I do not
name them because they continue to practice in the FTDC. Not all FTDC, nor other model
court problem-solving courts in New York, use all of the same practices as this one. See, e.g.,
Sara P. Schechter, Family Court Case Conferencing and Post-Dispositional Tracking: Tools
for Achieving Justice for Parents in the Child Welfare System, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 427–
430 (2001).
62. N.Y. Judiciary, Part 1, Family Court Act § 262(a)(i) (McKinney 2010).
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Programs or assistance identified by the parent or her advocate were
not options. The case would be monitored in court every thirty days or
so. At the point where a decision would be made about whether the
goals of the treatment plan had been met and the case should be ended,
a meeting would be held with the FTDC staff, the prosecuting
attorney, and the judge. Parent’s counsel was not invited to participate
in this meeting.
The judge’s power as leader of the FTDC team in this scenario
is pervasive. How is that power created and used? There is no statute
establishing the FTDC or court rules governing their practices.63 In
2006, eight years after the FTDC were first introduced in New York,
the New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA), the
administrative arm of the court system, convened an advisory
committee to develop principles and practices for FTDC in the state.64
Those principles and practices have yet to be issued by OCA. Without
standardized principles and practices—let alone direction from the
legislature or administrative rules—individual judges retain enormous
discretion in creating and enforcing their own understanding of
problem-solving court protocols.65 Judges also use what Professor
Miller has called “collateral judicial authority,” which “emanates from
the repeated interactions between the judge and the variety of court
officers and other players in the criminal or civil court system.”66 This
63. Problem-solving courts have been created by judicial fiat. Hoffman, supra note 22,
at 1571 (“almost every drug court in this nation, except for California's recent initiative, was
created by judges rather than legislatures.”); Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, N.Y. State
Unified Court Sys., Family Justice Program Initiative I, at 11 (1997) (introducing family
treatment courts in New York). See also In re Nolan W., supra note 46, at 1224 (“[a]llowing
juvenile courts to incarcerate parents for failing to comply with reunification orders is
problematic because there are no statutory principles to guide or constrain the court.”).
64. I was asked to serve on the advisory committee when it was established in 2006. We
met several times a year for about eighteen months. We finalized many of our
recommendations in 2007. The process was lively and respectful of a range of very differing
views. Our recommendations reflected a balance of concerns, including balancing access to
due process protections with the drug court team model approach.
65. Recommendations for safeguarding the judicial role in the drug court context
include: “(1) Judges must not directly or indirectly coerce defendants to secure waivers of
counsel; (2) Drug courts must do everything possible to ensure that every lawyer who wants to
appear in drug court has the opportunity to do so; (3) Sanctions must be imposed in a fair and
consistent manner; (4) The Judge who guides treatment should not be the judge who
determines termination or hears the underlying case after termination; (5) Ex parte
communication must never be permitted; (6) Drug court assignments must go to experiences,
interested judges who remain for more than a year.” NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 28–29.
66. Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, supra note 17, at 128; See also
Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm: Analyzing the Institutional Culture of
Family Courts through the Lens of Social Psychology Theory (discussing the impact of a
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judicial authority places enormous pressure on the other members of
the problem-solving team, including parent’s counsel, to go along with
the program, partly in exchange for influence on the judge or other
influential court personnel at other points in time.67 Yet in resisting
this pressure, counsel for individuals subject to the court have been
roundly criticized for their resistance to the program or have been
excluded from the process.68 Legal representation will not ameliorate
all of these concerns, especially if counsel does not fulfill her basic
duties to her clients.69 At the same time, if the lawyer who should
serve as translator, counselor, and protector is not there at crucial
decision-making moments or is stripped of those roles, as in the FTDC
example, the parent may be making a bargain beyond her capacity to
comprehend the risk.70
Beginning a court-based process without a legal advocate also
reinforces the power differential between the parent and the judge or
other members of the court team.71 This can be silencing,
manipulative, and scary. My colleague, Professor Philip Genty, has
written about the need for lawyers to empathize with a client’s fear of
the legal system, particularly that of indigent clients. This empathy
requires “an understanding of the client’s deep fear and mistrust of the
very legal system upon which the client must rely for a solution to her
or his legal problem.”72 This distrust does not suddenly disappear
because the judge has offered the parent treatment or services in
exchange for due process, a monitor instead of an adjudicator, a leader

variety of modes of informality, including repeat players, on the effectiveness of the court and
the fairness to litigants) (forthcoming 34 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 2010).
67. See Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender
about Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 54–58 (2000).
68. Id.; NOLAN, supra note 31, at 77–81 (discussing the redefined role of defense
counsel); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 27, at 31
(discussing that the defense counsel usually does not participate in post-adjudication staffing
with clients).
69. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 39; See also
Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 25–27.”
70. Embracing Addiction, supra note 17, at 1568 (factors like being more likely to
receive incarcerative sentences “may lead poor and minority defendants to accept diversion
into drug court where others would not.”); See also Jane M. Spinak, Why Defenders Feel
Defensive: The Defender's Role in Problem Solving Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1617
(2003); See also Quinn, supra note 67, at 56, 64.
71. Romancing the Court, supra note 14, at 267–68.
72. Philip M. Genty, Clients Don’t Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable In-House
Clinic and the Teaching of Empathy, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2000); See also Leigh
Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a Battered Woman Fleeing an
Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1013–19 (2007) (discussing ways in which
battered women do not trust the legal system to protect them).
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instead of a decider. The distrust does not arise in a vacuum. The
parent begins the court process in communities deeply suspicious of
government intervention; the line between the child protective
investigator removing a child and the judge approving that removal is
very thin.73 The Michigan study found that “African American
families experience child welfare as intrusive systems that do not fairly
assess and fail to appreciate their unique strength and weaknesses, do
not examine the detriment of removal to children, and do not
adequately explore the least restrictive placement options for their
children.”74 Their mistrust was highlighted through several examples
in which child protective services initiated investigations of African
American families who sought assistance from social services when
they had nowhere else to turn.75
When these families reach court, the price of submitting to the
court’s jurisdiction in exchange for help is magnified. In the FTDC,
for example, the parent exchanges the right to maintain custody of her
child and the right to contest allegations of neglect—including whether
efforts were made to assist her prior to the case being filed—for
treatment and services.76 The parent must admit to neglecting her

73. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare’s Paradox, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881
(2007) (describing the distrust of child welfare caseworkers and agencies by residents in an
overwhelmingly poor and African-American Chicago neighborhood while also finding the
significant dependence on and desire for the assistance and support of these same child
welfare officials).
74. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 23; Id. at 900–01
(“Poor families are left in the bind of resenting child welfare agencies' surveillance and
interference, yet wanting the agencies' continued presence as one of the few remaining sources
of public aid. Moreover, the child welfare system's racial geography shows that the agencies'
role as a safety net will be most prominent in black neighborhoods, where high rates of foster
care, unemployment, and inadequate social services converge.”).
75. See e.g., THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 21
(discussing an example where a parent was seeking assistance to purchase a stove and was
investigated for not feeding her family.); Roberts, supra note 73, at 893 (“The child welfare
system exacts an onerous price: it requires poor mothers to relinquish custody of their children
in exchange for state support needed to care for them”).
76. Roberts, supra note 73, at 893; see Oler, supra note 21 (discussing the child welfare
agency’s statutory requirement of reasonable efforts to preclude the need for foster care).
Additionally, the parent may waive her right to challenge whether the state has satisfied the
legal mandates for temporary removal of a child from parental care as defined in Nicholson v.
Scoppetta, 3 N.Y. 3d 357, 378 (2004) (“[a] court must weigh, in the factual setting before it,
whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid
removal. It must balance that risk against the harm removal might bring, and it must determine
factually which course is in the child's best interests. Additionally, the court must specifically
consider whether imminent risk to the child might be eliminated by other means . . .”).
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child, a humiliating experience.77 The humiliation occurs in several
ways. First, the admission acknowledges personal responsibility
without the state acknowledging concomitant responsibility.78 Second,
as Professor Miller and others have identified, the client’s real voice is
silenced to fit into the drug treatment story with its prescribed script
and roles.79 Finally, the admission is made in the context of the
broader way in which parents are perceived and characterized in
Family Court proceedings. The Michigan study found a significant
negative mischaracterization of African American youth and families
in the child welfare system and court proceedings which was not
supported by the facts and at times negatively affected the course of
the case.80 Language that depersonalizes all families, such as referring
to a parent as “Mom” throughout a proceeding rather than by using the
parent’s name, is magnified with the knowledge that these are
disproportionately minority parents.81
The potential for problem-solving courts—whether the
traditional Family Court or the current reform models—to magnify the
disparate impact on families of color, particularly African American
families, is rooted in the belief that these courts are the best place to
resolve the issues that bring these families to court. But if these courts
succeed in their goals to be the locus for services and assistance to

77. For examples of parental experiences in the child welfare system and family court
see Rise Magazine, available at http://www.risemagazine.org/issues/Issue_3/issue_3.html (last
visited on Apr. 15, 2010).
78. See generally Oler, supra, note 21; Violet Rittenhour, From the Outside In: Parents
need
and
Independent
Voice,
RISE
MAGAZINE
4,
available
at
http://www.risemagazine.org/issues/Issue_5/issue_5.html (last visited on Apr. 4, 2010)
(discussing a parental advocate disappointment that parents at a child welfare conference
blamed only themselves for their problems without also holding the child welfare system
accountable and that child welfare officials did not recognize their need to change, too).
79. Embracing Addiction, supra note 17, at 1566. There is a long history of low income
clients accommodating a proscribed speech. See e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 1 (1990).
80. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 31. See also
CHAPIN HALL REPORT, supra note 18, at 19. The admission is also made in the broader context
of societal views of drug use. See Richard C. Boldt, The “Tomahawk” and the “Healing
Balm”: Drug Treatment Courts in Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER
& CLASS 45 (discussing the history of drug policy in the United States including “the totalizing
moral judgments that pervasively are directed against drug users throughout American
society”).
81. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30, at 32–33. One of the
starkest illustrations of disparate treatment was found in several case records that contained no
documentation of any past or current substance abuse. The Caucasian parents were described
as having “no history of substance abuse,” while the caseworker records that each time that the
African American parent “denies history of substance abuse.” Id. at 32.
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families as well as the ultimate decision-maker, the danger that
families of color will disproportionately be affected is hard to deny.
These families are less likely to find assistance in their communities,82
more likely to be identified and investigated,83 and more likely to have
their children removed.84 They are, therefore, more likely to find
themselves in court and subject to the conditions I have outlined. As
court reformers consider the best configurations of Family Courts, they
need to address the unanticipated consequence of the disparate impact
on their work.
Supporters of problem-solving courts lament analyses such as
these, in part, because they believe we are left with the same broken
court system we have always had.85 How we move beyond this
stalemate leads me to take a closer look at the chasm that will have to
be bridged if the concerns of both supporters and critiquers are to be
addressed.
III. TALKING ABOUT PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
The conversation at the heart of the University of Maryland
Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class symposium on
problem-solving courts highlights how difficult it is to talk
meaningfully and effectively about the problem-solving court reform
movement. The participants in the symposium who have been
developing and experiencing the court reforms on the ground
emphasize the aspects of the reforms that appear to be working,
82. THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 30 at 17–18, 20; Roberts,
supra note 73, at 899 (citing a study by Scott Allard who discovered “a striking mismatch
between neighborhood need and access to support services such as substance abuse treatment,
food assistance, job training, education, and emergency aid.”).
83. Brooks & Roberts, supra note 21, at 453–55. There is evidence of racial bias at
every stage of child welfare decision making, from reporting child maltreatment to placement
of children by caseworkers and judges..
84. Roberts, supra note 73, at 882 (stating that “A black child is four times as likely as a
white child to be placed in foster care.”).
85. Transcript of Panel Three of Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the
Experts, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 139 (2010) (Judge Hueston stating
that
I’ll leave my comment with this: I think it’s been well documented that
business as usual does not work. Our probation agents have hundreds of
probationers on their dockets; they cannot monitor the chronic defendant
effectively. And so, we have a choice of, [you] know, we’ve got some
warts in drug courts and problem solving courts so let’s just throw the
baby out with the bath water and not do them; let’s just do business as
usual, which that doesn’t work so well, because look at the recidivism
rate; there is very little treatment in jail, people recidivate within 3 months
after they get out. It doesn’t really work.).
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including cost effectiveness, diminished recidivism, and community
satisfaction.86 The “critical critics” and the “supportive critics”
emphasize ways in which the reforms fail to accomplish their goals or
where those goals potentially conflict with other strongly held beliefs
about issues like procedural justice, judicial impartiality and individual
autonomy.87
The inability of supporters and critiquers to listen to the others’
concerns has limited the effectiveness of both reform efforts and
alternative or supplemental reform regimes. This failure may stem in
part from what has been called naïve realism: our alacrity in seeing
how the values of those with whom we disagree shape their factual
beliefs, while we are concomitantly unable to understand how the
values we hold shape our own factual beliefs.88 As a result, each side
distrusts the other because they can only see how the other side’s
values shape the facts, not how their own values do so.
The symposium conveners were given considerable credit by
the speakers and panelists for putting together a conference where a
range of perspectives were presented and discussed, a situation rarely
found in the problem-solving court world. Nevertheless, there were
two moments when naïve realism captured the discussion. A number
of critiquers (including myself) used the expression “not drinking the
Kool-Aid” to indicate that they were not blithely swallowing the tenets
of problem-solving courts. Professor Brenda Bratton Blom took the
opportunity to point out that using that expression did not engender
good will or move the discussion forward. She was right. Soon after,
86. Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the Experts, 10 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS (2010); Tamar M. Meekins, Risky Business: Criminal
Specialty Courts and the Ethical Obligations of the Zealous Criminal Defender, 12 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 75, 84–85 (2007) (“The outcomes that are most praised by specialty court
supporters are a reduction in recidivism rates and an increase in the number of defendants who
successfully receive treatment.”).
87. Professor Shdaimah used the term “critical supporter” to indicate her willingness to
try to help court reformers institute problem-solving court methods while wanting, at the same
time, to point out the potential negative aspects of the reform efforts. See, e.g., Boldt, supra
note 48, at 1217 (“ the objection is that the drug treatment court movement not only presents
difficulties for individual defendants and their attorneys, it also undermines larger efforts to
develop an effective drug policy premised on a public health model.”) and Embracing
Addiction, supra note 17, at 418. (“The court's methodology implicates political issues of
coercion and freedom in ways that derive from and respond to some of the central policy
problems underlying the interaction of race, poverty, and drugs in urban environments . . . [i]n
particular, the court's rejection of due process in favor of treatment expresses the now-classic
opposition between positive and negative liberty; that is, the freedom to be left alone and the
freedom to ‘determine someone to be . . . this rather than that.’”).
88. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837,
895 (2008).
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audience members provided several examples of a problem-solving
court violating the due process protections that the court’s own rules
required. A supporter on the panel then in session simply dismissed the
examples as outliers. A member of the audience responded that
dismissing these examples as outliers without determining whether
they represented a more significant problem in the court also
undermined good will and stopped discussion. The panelist was
unmoved.
The symposium’s effort at constructive dialogue, and the
specific interactions among participants that I explore here, refocused
my attention in two ways. First, I wonder whether our inability to hear
the other point of view in professional conversations is a reflection on
our deeper inability to consider the multiplicity of viewpoints and
experiences of court litigants. Second, has our failure to talk across our
differences mean that both sides are ignoring important matters in the
evolution of court reform?
Let me propose several ways in which we can begin to address
those questions. The first is to ask whether we can reach consensus on
the purpose of these courts. Professor Corey Shdaimah and Professor
Richard Boldt both pointed out during the conference that the tension
between the therapeutic and the punitive aspects of the courts has not
been resolved.89 Nor have we clearly identified what outcomes we are
measuring; administrative and cost efficiencies regularly bump up
against the substantive outcomes. Do we prioritize some outcomes—
lower recidivism, speedier court processes, and happier judicial
personnel—over other equally satisfying results, such as more
effective dispute resolution processes or better access to services?
This dilemma inevitably leads to grappling with the
distribution of resources: when is it suitable to shift resources to courtbased processes and when might resources work more effectively
outside the court system? Which issues do we want to divert from the
court system and which would be better served through court
89. Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: A Conversation with the Experts, 10 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS (forthcoming 2010). An example of that tension is
found in a footnote in the recent California Supreme Court decision, where the court notes that
“The Agency describes these contempt orders as ‘therapeutic incarceration’ and asserts:
“Sometimes it takes a caring consequence, such as court ordered incarceration, to get the
parent's attention in a way that enables the parent to hit their own personal rock bottom and
become aware of the need to comply with the court's orders for treatment so reunification with
their child can be achieved.” However, the Agency has offered no empirical support for the
proposition that the threat of parental incarceration encourages higher reunification rates. Even
if there were such data, the appropriate body to consider whether to modify the family
reunification process by incorporating contempt sanctions and parental incarceration is the
Legislature.” In re Nolan W., supra note 46, at 1236 n.8.
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processes? None of these questions can be answered without a
significant commitment to measuring our efforts and responding
honestly to what we have found, even if we don’t like the answers.90
These courts sprang originally from a heartfelt desire by judges to
respond to what they considered a broken criminal justice system.
When does the desire to do good have to be tempered by evidence of
what works? Recent studies have certainly painted a far more nuanced
picture of when drug courts may be effective.91 Will this data be used
to modify or even eliminate the programs that don’t work? How can
the flexibility of developing innovative approaches to solving
problems be balanced by principles of fairness and equality?92 And
finally, who should make these decisions? Legislatures? Executive
agencies? Court systems?93 As a society, who do we want making
these decisions?
IV. CONCLUSION
Problem-solving courts have proliferated in multiple
dimensions of poor and minority peoples’ lives even as supporters and
critics of these courts struggle to define the purpose of these courts and
to evaluate their effectiveness. In the child welfare arena, less intrusive
and more community-based approaches to addressing the complex
societal problems that lead to child protection intervention in family
life may be thwarted by the expansion of therapeutic court-based
solutions. The judge-driven problem-solving paradigm that shifts
responsibility from society to the individual to resolve the issues
disrupting the family is likely to have a disparate impact on minority
families who are less likely to find assistance in their communities,
more likely to be identified and investigated, and more likely to have
their children removed. In addition, shifting to back-end court-based
services increases surveillance of parents that can result in additional
monitoring, additional legal proceedings, and even a shift into the

90. Reforming Family Court, supra note 16, at 16–24 (identifying ways in which court
reform efforts have not been critically analyzed for effectiveness).
91. Boldt, supra note 80, at 49–60.
92. For example, I would be more supportive of FTDC in New York if the court system
had adopted the advisory committee principles and practices that set basic standards of
practice for everyone involved in FTDC in the state.
93. In re Nolan W., supra note 46, at 1224 where the court notes that “[t]here is no
indication that the Legislature intended parents to be punished in this manner. Moreover, as
the facts of this case demonstrate, allowing juvenile courts to incarcerate parents for failing to
comply with reunification orders is problematic because there are no statutory principles to
guide or constrain the court.”
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criminal justice system. Once these families find themselves in
problem-solving courts, moreover, the traditional due process
protections afforded by an impartial judge no longer serve as a final
defense to improper or ill advised government intervention. For these
reasons, court reformers must consider the unanticipated consequence
of the disparate impact of their work on families of color as they strive
to expand and improve problem-solving courts.

